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Abstract
We discuss the simulations of the norm game between players at nodes
of a directed random network. The final boldness of the players can vary
with the initial one as the Θ function. One of the conditions of this be-
haviour is that the player who does not punish automatically becomes a
defector. The threshold value of the initial boldness can be interpreted as
a norm strength. It increases with the punishment and decreases with its
cost. Surprisingly, it also decreases with the number of potential punish-
ers. The numerical results are discussed in the context of the statistical
data on crimes in Northern Ireland and New Zealand, on divorces in USA,
and on the alcohol consumption in Poland.
1 Introduction
The cultural paradigm of the supremacy of an individual over collective thought
is well established in our culture. On the contrary to this, there is much evidence
that individual decisions and beliefs strongly depend on the social environment.
The effects related are the spiral of silence [1, 2], the pluralistic ignorance [3, 4],
the bystander effect [5], the group polarization [6], the groupthink [7], the band-
wagon effect [8, 9], the Abilene paradox [10], stereotyping [11, 12] and others.
All these effects show that social groups influence or sometimes even deter-
mine their members’ behaviour. It is natural that this notion shifts attention
of scientists to investigations of an interaction between agents rather than the
agents themselves, notwithstanding this interaction perception merely in indi-
vidual minds. A physicist could be surprised how far the analogy can be driven
between the cognitive-emotional social field [13] and the electromagnetic field
[14].
The subject of social norms seems to belong to these parts of the science on
human behaviour, which can be treated as a systematic science (in terms of Ref.
[13]). Up to our knowledge, the first attempt of such a treatment was done by
Robert Axelrod [15, 16]. A brief introduction to the problem can be found in the
introduction to Ref. [17]. Axelrod was inspired by the idea of the evolutionary
principle (EP), formulated by himself as follows: ...what works well for a player
is more likely to be used again, whereas what turns out poorly is more likely to
be discarded. [18]. Axelrod enumerated three independent mechanisms which
lead to the realization of EP: i) more effective individuals survive more likely,
ii) players learn by trial and error and maintain strategies which are more effec-
tive, iii) players observe each other and imitate the winners. Axelrod suggested
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that in the problem of norms, the third mechanism is most applicable. In the
opinion of the present author the second mechanism is even more important
for norms which can persist in the timescale of the order of human life. The
argument is that such norms are characteristic for a social group rather than for
a given person, and they are obeyed sometimes just by tradition. Investigation
of this kind of norms with statistical tools makes sense, as the psychics of an
individual agent can be reduced there to a black box. This is the area where a
sociophysicist is allowed to enter.
In our previous work [19] a new scheme of simulation was formulated for the
norm game [15, 16]. Most briefly, the original version of the norm game can
be described as follows. N players are positioned at nodes of a fully connected
network. The players are endowed with their boldnesses, i.e. initial probabilities
of defecting (breaking the norm), and with vengeances, i.e. the probabilities of
punishing the defection, if observed at other players. Next, a player is selected
and tempted to break the norm. If he does, he is granted with some prize.
Further, if a neigbour of the defector decides to punish, the defector has to pay
a fine. Finally, also the punisher incurs some cost of his action. An application
of the genetic algorithm leads to spreading of most effective strategies.
This game, with some simplifications described in Section II, was simulated
recently in a directed Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network [19]. The main result was the his-
tory dependence of the final distribution of the agents’ boldness. Namely, a
discontinuity was found of the dependence of the final against the initial bold-
ness. The values of the initial boldness of the players were selected from the
range (0.9ρ, ρ), where 0 < ρ < 1. Below some threshold value ρc of ρ, the mean
value of the final boldness was found to be close to zero. When ρ > ρc, the
same mean value was found to be close to one. Calculated values of ρc were
found to decrease with the cost parameter γ. In parallel, a similar bistability
was obtained by means of analytical calculations [19, 20].
The aim of the present work is to investigate this discontinuity. New numer-
ical results to be reported here are as follows:
i) A necessary condition for the appearance of the discontinuity is that once a
player abstains from punishing, his boldness is set to one.
ii) The discontinuity remains in the undirected growing networks: both in the
scale free and the exponential ones, but it disappears in the directed growing
networks.
iii) The value of ρc increases with the punishment and it decreases with the
mean node degree.
These results are described in Section III with more details. They are discussed
in Section IV in the context of some statistical data, which display a relatively
quick variations in time. Final remarks in Section V close the text.
2 The simulation algorithm
Basically, we use the same algorithm as in Ref. [19], generalized for different
network topologies. Players are placed at nodes of a network of a given topol-
ogy. For the directed Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network, for each node i its degree k(i) is
selected from the Poisson distribution, and then the neigbors of i are chosen
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with uniform probability. The links are directed from the neigbours to the node
k; this means that the player at i can be punished by his neighbours, but not the
opposite. Obviously, each neigbour has its own neighbours who can punish him.
As the next step, each player i is endowed by the probability that he de-
fects b(i) (boldness) and the probability that he punishes v(i) (vengeance), with
the condition b(i) + v(i) ≤ 1. The boldnesses are selected from the range
((ρ− 1)/100, ρ/100), where ρ is an integer number from 1 to 100. Then, ρ is a
measure of the initial boldness in the system. For each i, the vengeance is set
as v(i) = (1− b(i))/µ, where µ ≥ 1. Then, the initial state is described by two
parameters ρ and µ. As a rule, µ = 1 or µ = 2.
The dynamics is described by two parameters β and γ. A node i is selected
randomly. The player at i defects with probability b(i). If he does, his boldness
b(i) is set to 1, and his vengeance v(i) is set to 0. If he does not, b(i) is set
to 0 and v(i) is set to 1. This settings can be treated as an example of social
labelling [21]. Then, a neighbour j of i is checked if he punishes or not, with his
actual vengeance v(i). If he does not punish, he is treated as a defector. Then,
his boldness b(j) is set to 1 and his vengeance v(j) is set to 0. If j punishes, the
boldness of punished i is reduced by a factor 1− β, i.e.
b(i)→ b(i)(1− β) (1)
Simultaneously, the punisher j pays the cost of punishing, what leads to a
reduction of his vengeance as
v(j)→ v(j)(1 − γ) (2)
In this way, we omit the parameters of the payoffs, which are not necessary. If
one of the neigbours punishes, the other neigbours are no more checked if they
do. The algorithm just selects another player i to be tempted to defect.
The simulation is repeated for the undirected growing networks: exponential
and scale-free ones, and for the directed growing networks. In the last case the
direction of nodes was selected either from the new node to its older neigbours,
or the opposite.
3 Numerical results
Although the threshold effect is present for the directed Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks
[19], it disappears in the directed Albert-Baraba´si networks where the direction
of bonds is chosen from newly attached nodes to their older neighbours. The
effect disappears also in the latter case when the direction of all bonds is in-
verted. These results are shown in Fig. 1. Then, this combination of the age
of nodes and the direction of bonds between them does modify significantly the
system behaviour. The nature of this modification remains to be clarified.
The simulations were concentrated on the calculation on the threshold bold-
ness ρc against the punishment parameter β and the cost parameter γ. Let
us repeat that if the initial value of ρ, what is a rough measure of the initial
boldness, is smaller than ρc, then the final boldness is small; the defection is
3
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Figure 1: The mean boldness for Albert-Baraba´si growing networks withM = 3.
For the undirected network the threshold value is observed at ρc about 53. For
two directed networks the direction is either from new to old nodes or the
opposite. Then, either new nodes can punish those to which they are attached
(the plot ’new’), or the old nodes can punish those attached to them (the plot
’old’). No threshold is observed for the directed networks.
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rare. On the contrary, if ρ > ρc, most agents defect in the stationary state. In
other words, it is more difficult to defect if ρc is large. Then, ρc can be treated
as a measure of the norm strength.
The simulations confirm the previous result [19] that ρc increases with the
punishment constant β. Also, they give a new result, that ρc decreases with
the punishment cost γ. Both facts are natural; the norm is stronger if the
punishment is heavy for the defector, and it is weaker if the punishment is
costful for the punisher. These results are shown in Fig. 2 for the directed
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network with the mean number of potential punishers λ = 5, and
in Fig. 3 for the undirected Albert-Barab´asi networks.
On the other hand, these results suggest that the norm strength decreases
with the potential number of neighbours. To verify this, we have calculated ρc
for the directed Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks for various numbers of in-neigbours λ as
well for the undirected scale-free networks for various numbers of the parameter
M . The results are shown in Fig. 4 a,b. In both cases the same effect is
observed, that the norm strength ρc decreases with the mean number of potential
punishers, which is λ for the the directed Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks and which is
2M for the undirected scale-free networks.
This results is somewhat surprising. Before the calculation is done, we ex-
pected that an increase of the number of punisher should make the norm more
strong. We have to admit that the process contains some internal feedback from
those tempted to their neighbours. Once the norm is broken, those who can
punish have to decide if the punishment cost is not too large. According to our
algorithm once they do not punish, they become defectors. If the norm was
broken at all, this outcome was not possible. In this sense, the larger number
of potential punishers who do not punish can lead to an avalanche of new de-
fectors. This is a possible explanation of the observed decrease of ρc with the
number of neighbors.
4 Some stylized facts
Some statistical data suggest that indeed some ’equilibrium’ social states are
possible, where a norm is obeyed to some definite extent. Once such a state
ceases its stability, the system moves to another state, where the mean boldness
is constant again or it fluctuates only slowly. This transformation can be seen
in the statistical data as a large change of a given quantity, accompanied by
its relatively slow variation before and after the change. Such a change can be
interpreted as a discontinuous jump between two states. Here we are going to
mention four examples and to comment them shortly.
Our first example is the number of recorded criminal offences per year in
Northern Ireland. Between 1980 and 1997 it varied between 50 thousands and
70 thousands, but it increased to about 120 thousands in 1997 [22, 23]. The
plot is shown in Fig. 5. This jump was probably triggered by the fact that
since 1997 the Provisional IRA has observed a ceasefire. At this moment, large
hidden arsenals became useless for the patriotic purposes. As a consequence,
the social norm ’preserve your gun for the outbreak’ has failed.
The data on murders in New Zealand between 1950 and now show a simi-
lar dynamics [24]. Before 1986 the number of homicides did not excess 60 per
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Figure 2: The value of the norm strength ρc for the directed Erdo¨s-Re´nyi net-
work, for µ = 1 and µ = 2.
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Figure 3: The value of the norm strength ρc for the undirected scale-free
Barab´asi-Albert network, for M = 2 and M = 4.
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Figure 4: The value of the norm strength ρc for the directed Erdo¨s-Re´nyi net-
works for λ = 3− 7 and for the undirected scale-free Albert-Baraba´si network,
for M = 2− 7.
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Figure 5: The number of recorded criminal offences in thousands per year in
Northern Ireland (+, solid line) [22, 23] and the number of homicides per year
in New Zealand (x, dash line) [24] against time. Sharp changes are visible,
which mark the cease-fire in Northern Ireland in 1997 and the transition to free
economy, started in 1984 in New Zealand.
year, but it was not smaller than 120 per year between 1987 and 1994. The
plot is shown also in Fig. 5. This change is correlated with the transformation
of New Zealand to free-trade economy, started in 1984. Here the norm is the
Commandment ’You shall not murder’ which did not cease its universality in
80-s; perhaps it was the punishment what decreased.
Our third example is the number of divorces in USA (Fig. 6). The data
[25] show that this number increased twice (from about 2.5 to about 5.0 per
1000 population) between 1965 and 1975. This change was accompanied by
a similarly large relative increase of numbers of rapes, murders and robberies
within the same time period [26]. Obviously, this fall of norms was triggered by
the Vietnam war, but it is not easy to separate this cause of divorces from the
accompanying sexual revolution. Divorced people often look for other partners,
not necessarily unmarried, what accelerates the process like in a chain reaction
[27]; still the related lifetime is not shorter than a couple of years.
Our last example is the fall of spirits consumption in Poland in 1981 from 8
to 6 litres of pure alcohol per an adult per year [28]. At that time, Polish people
had drank mainly spirits, while the French preferred wine and the German -
beer. To drink alcohol is in Poland a kind of social norm, to show friendship
and empathy, paying no heed to health losses. This need for a demonstration
of common feeling of being unhappy was released by the new hope of a political
transformation, brought by the free trade union ”Solidarity” and the message
of John Paul II. The political transformation in Europe is not visible at the
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Figure 6: Divorces (+, solid line) [25], murders (x, dash line) [26] and rapes
(*, doted line) [26] in USA against time. For clarity, the numbers are rescaled:
divorces to 500, murders to 10 and rapes to 35 per 105 inhabitants per year.
The peak on the left on the divorces curve is due to WWII.
same data for other countries; the consumption of wine in France and of beer
in Germany decreased rather smoothly [28], as shown in Fig. 7.
As we see, all these changes were triggered by some events: the ceasefire in
Northern Ireland, the economic transformation in New Zealand, Vietnam war
in USA or political reforms in Poland. To interpret these changes in terms of
our model picture, we admit that in each case the event as those listed above
changes the punishment or/and it cost. This influences the temptation process,
which is more or less steady in the society; new and new people are faced with
the question: to divorce or not, to drink or not, to break law or not. Their de-
cisions are influenced by individual attitudes of their neighbours, which are also
determined in the process. As an output we see a social change in macroscopic
data.
We note that according to our numerical results, the abrupt fall of norm
preserving is a consequence of the rule ’those who abstain from punishing, de-
fect’. In other words, the society is divided into defectors and punishers. A
question arises, if this rule makes sense in our four examples. To find an an-
swer, we have to identify the punishment. In the first and second example to
punish is to report the case to the police. Then, the interpretation is clear: who
did not report to the police is guilty. In the third example to punish could be
to condemn divorces in public. However, in principle one could be faithful in
marriage and tolerant towards manifestations of sexual promiscuity. We face
the same problem also in the fourth example, where many people prefer the
strategy ’don’t drink but let drink’. Then, our numerical result seems to apply
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Figure 7: Consumption of spirits in Poland (+, solid line), beer in Germany
(x, dash line) and wine in France (*, dotted line), in litres of pure alcohol per
an adult (+15) per year, against time. The consumption of beer and wine in
Poland, wine and spirits in Germany and spirits and beer in France did not
excess 4 litres. All data from Ref. [28].
to two examples out of four.
This difficulty is solved, if the norm itself is redefined as ’the duty to punish’.
According to this new point of view, to obey a norm means to declare in public
that this norm should be obeyed. In particular in our third example what is
important is to declare in public that the institution of marriage is holy and
inviolable. Similarly in the fourth example the norm is to insist that to be ac-
cepted in the group, everybody must drink. In this way, the metagame (in terms
of Axelrod) is the game. This transformation can be interpreted theoretically
as follows: the preservation of a given norm should be evaluated by counting
not those people who preserve it, but rather those who punish for its defection.
This formulation raises the question about the status of norms which vanish in
a continuous way. This in turn calls for an experimental criterion, which change
is continuous and which is sharp. These questions are beyond the scope of this
paper.
5 Final remarks
Even if numerically complete, the study is preliminary. It reveals the connec-
tion between consequences of decisions of individual players and the state of
the society at a macro-level. In the above calculations, these consequences are
chosen as to label the players: who once defected will never punish and who
once punished will never defect. In this way, the society is divided into two
11
opposite groups. These rules of labelization should be justified and relaxed if
necessary in accordance with the social reality, and these modifications in each
case do depend on the specific norm under consideration.
To conclude, the sharp dependence of the final boldness on its initial distri-
bution follows from the labelling consequences of initial decisions of the players.
This sharpness does not depend much on the network topology. However, it
can be removed if the direction of the links is determined by the age of nodes
in growing networks.
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